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COMPUTERS, URINALS, AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: CONFESSIONS OF A PATRON 
SAINT 
Wayne R. LaF ave* 
It was a stark and dormy night. 1 
This is neither a Lyttonish2 Spoonerism,3 a Jabberwockian4 galima-
tias, nor an embarrassing typo missed by an astigmatic editor. It is in-
stead a carefully chosen exordium, one expected to perform well its 
proper function, that is to say, "to awaken the interest of ... readers. " 5 
* David C. Baum Professor of Law Emeritus and Center for Advanced Study Pro-
fessor of Law Emeritus, University of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965, 
University of Wisconsin. 
1. If you find this sentence nonsensical, please so advise Jerry Israel and tell him 
to pay me ten dollars. See Wayne R. LaFave, Some Random Thoughts from a Distant 
Collaborator, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2431, 2436 n.17 (1996). 
2. For law students and others perplexed by this word, I should explain that I refer 
to the immortal Baron Edward G.E.L. Bulwer-Lytton, a prolific novelist who in his oth-
erwise obscure 1830 novel entitled Paul Clifford penned the extraordinary and now fa-
mous opening line: "It was a dark and stormy night." Lytton 's creation of this remarka-
ble proem is celebrated each and every year with a competition to see who can out-
Lytton the other contestants in creating a gripping opener. See SAN JosE MERCURY 
NEWS, May 18, 1994, at lB, SB. I may enter this article in the next competition. 
3. For law students and others perplexed by this word, I should explain that the 
reference is to those delightful malapropisms that originated with the immortal William 
Archibald Spooner, a distinguished Anglican clergyman and warden of New College, 
Oxford. Spooner, a nervous man, was given to mixing up his words so that the initial 
letters or syllables of two or more words were reversed. For example, on one occasion 
the good Reverend concluded a wedding ceremony by saying to the groom, "It is kiss-
tomary to cuss the bride." Such expressions became known as Spoonerisms. See 
ALBERT G. JOHNSON, JR., SPOONERISMS AND OTHER HOME GROWN HUMOR 
(1986). 
For law students and others perplexed by the word malapropism, I could explain 
that it refers to the ridiculous misuse of words in the fashion of the character named 
Mrs. Malaprop in the immortal Richard Sheridan's 1775 comedy The Rivals. But I 
won't, as this has to stop somewhere! 
4. For law students and others perplexed by this word, I should explain that it 
comes from the title of the nonsense poem Jabberwocky, which appears in the immortal 
Lewis Carroll's delightful and timeless children's book Through the Looking Glass. 
That word is "immortal," not "immoral." But see Adam Gopnik, Wonderland-
Lewis Carroll and the Loves of His Life, in NEW YORKER, Oct. 9, 1995, at 82 (book 
review). 
5. WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 463 (1984). It sometimes goes 
by other names, as in Michael O'Donoghue, How To Write Good, in LAUGHING MAT-
2553 
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The two adjectives in that perplexing proem were uppermost in my 
mind on the evening in question, when I sat in my office putting the 
wraps on this article. "Stark" because it was a night during which I had 
managed to revise the piece to accomplish a "blunt unadorned style or 
treatrnent"6 of my subject; and "dorrny" because it was a night in 
which my labors would allow me, as with a golfer so situated,7 to bring 
my efforts to a favorable conclusion. 
Outside my office, on the other hand, Lytton's own exordium8 was 
apt. And thus, just as others have done,9 I can appropriate it here: It was 
a dark and stormy night. Those circumstances - beneficial in so many 
TERS 292, 293 (Gene Shalit ed., 1987): "The 'grabber' is the initial sentence of a novel 
or short story designed to jolt the reader out of his complacency and arouse his curios-
ity, forcing him to press onward. For example: 'It's no good, Alex,' she rejoined, 'Even 
if I did love you, my father would never let me marry an alligator.' " 
It is beyond question that an attention-grabbing exordium is the hallmark of any 
publication that both is well written and becomes well read. See GEORGIANNE EN-
SIGN, GREAT BEGINNINGS: OPENING LINES OF GREAT NOVELS (1996); 
O'Donoghue, supra, at 293. That being the case, it is apparent why I was so careful in 
selecting the seven words that begin this article: I am hoping that this piece will escape 
the fate of most law review articles, which typically are read only by the author, the au-
thor's close relatives, and the poor saps who have to edit them for the law review. (I 
resemble that remark - Ed.) 
The exordium set out at the beginning of this article won out only after I consid-
ered and rejected several other possibilities. I was always greatly impressed with the 
famed incipit in Moby Dick, but somehow "Call me Wayne" didn't have the same 
punch. I also gave serious attention to the advice to professional writers I recall reading 
somewhere - that it is necessary at the outset to tie into those subjects readers are 
most interested in, such as celebrity, sex, and religion. I thus almost settled on: "My 
God, OJ., why don't you make a clean breast of it?" But I couldn't figure out how to 
segue from that to the Fourth Amendment. 
6. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2226 (1981). 
7. "Dormy" is a golfing term not ordinarily known by one with my limited skills 
on the links, for it refers to "being up as many holes as remain to be played." Id. at 
675. 
8. See supra note 2. 
9. The most public and persistent appropriation of Lytton's words has been by a 
sometime author and all-time canine who works from the roof of his dog house. See, 
e.g., CHARLES M. SCHULZ, BEING A DOG Is A FULL TIME JOB 73 (1994); CHARLES 
M. SCHULZ, MAKE WAY FOR THE KING OF THE JUNGLE 89 (1995). As remarkable 
as it may seem, Snoopy's writings in this vein on one occasion provided the basis for an 
appellate court to decide what interpretation should be given to the language of an in-
surance contract. See ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. 
Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 216 n.42 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Indeed, Lytton's curtain raiser occasionally has been appropriated by appellate 
courts summarizing the relevant facts of the case below, sometimes with attribution, see 
Abbott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1987), but usually without, see United 
States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 959 
(1991); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Hess Tankship Co., 661 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. Unit 
A. Nov. 1981); Burrows v. Nash, 259 P.2d 106, 111 (Or. 1953). 
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ways to those in the legal profession10 - persisted, and finally the 
storm increased in its violence and intensity. Then a bolt of lightning 
struck just a few feet from my window. Both I and my computer, on 
which I had been pounding the entire evening, were jarred about a foot 
off our respective pedestals. The computer - but fortunately not me -
emitted an intense green glow for about a minute, causing me to fear 
that the poor thing had passed on.11 However, it had not only survived, 
but also appeared to have enjoyed a moment of complete independence 
from me. At the top of the screen, in that space I had reserved for the 
yet unchosen title of my article, there now appeared a line of typescript 
reading "Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions 
of a Patron Saint." 12 Ignoring the machine's self-serving sense of priori-
ties, I quickly realized that I had been provided with that which had 
heretofore eluded me: a nearly perfect13 title for this article. It per-
formed the essential function of leaving anyone who scrutinized the 
Review's table of contents virtually in the dark about the subject matter 
of this piece! 
10. This is because, as appellate courts have noted, a night that is "dark and 
stonny" often gives rise to events that become a profitable basis for litigation. This is 
most frequently the case as to motor vehicle accidents. See Abbott, 507 So. 2d at 905; 
Summit Township Road Dist. v. Hayes Freight Lines, 194 N.E.2d 682, 684 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1963); Sebastian v. Wood, 66 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Iowa 1954); Davis v. Lord, 61 A.2d 
519, 520 (N.H. 1948); Charmley v. Lewis, 729 P.2d 567, 568 (Or. 1986); Roylance v. 
Davies, 424 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah 1967) (Crockett, C.J., dissenting); Pollard v. Wittman, 
183 P.2d 175, 178 (Wash. 1947). But it is also the case as to accidents involving trains, 
see, e.g., St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Simons, 176 F.2d 654, 658 (10th Cir. 1949); Minninger v. 
New York Cent. R.R., 109 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ind. Ct. App. 1952); and ships, see, e.g., 
Allied Chem. Corp., 661 F.2d at 1046; United States v. MN Santa Clara I, 887 F. Supp. 
825, 829 (D.S.C. 1995); as to worker's compensation accidents, see, e.g., Northern 
Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845, 846 (Alaska 1966); and as to criminal activity such as 
drug smuggling, see, e.g., Betancourt·Arretuche, 933 F.2d at 91; cf. Hutchens v. 
McClure, 269 P.2d 473, 474 (Kan. 1954) ("dark and stonny weather"); Estate of Bald-
inger v. Ann Arbor R.R., 127 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Mich. 1964) ("a dark, overcast, stonny 
morning"); Case v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co., 160 P.2d 313, 316 (Or. 1945) ("a dark 
and stonny morning"). 
11. Since I have never been able to fathom the workings of these modem devices, 
I was not quite sure what harm the electronic surge might have inflicted. But I feared 
the worst. I was sure that the hardware had melted, that the software had frozen, and 
that all essential parts (e.g., clutch, distributor, tweeter, woofer) had been pennanently 
disabled. 
12. I should point out that this is not the first time that I have had a computer play 
tricks on me. See Wayne R. LaFave, Mapp Revisited: Shakespeare, J., and Other 
Fourth Amendment Poets, 47 STAN. L. REv. 261, 263 (1995). 
13. But not absolutely perfect, for it lacked any of the popular buzzwords such as 
"deconstruction',.and "hermeneutics." See Andrew J. McClurg, The World's Greatest 
Law Review Article, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1995, at 84. But it did have the obligatory colon, 
and admirably perfonned its principal function described in the text following. 
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At least the title indicates that the article is somehow concerned 
with "the Fourth Amendment," though for anyone who knows me or is 
at all familiar with my work, that piece of information hardly would 
come as a revelation. The fact of the matter is that I almost always 
write about the Fourth Amendment; I am in an academic rut so deep as 
to deserve recognition in the Guinness Book World of Records. Search 
and seizure has been my cheval de bataille during my entire time as a 
law professor and even when I was a mere law student.14 And over that 
substantial period, I have peppered or salted - depending on your taste 
- the law reviews with a not insubstantial number of Fourth Amend-
ment commentaries. 15 Replowing the same ground for so long presents 
special challenges, which is why in recent years I have had to resort to 
grotesque phantasmagoria, 16 polysyllabical sesquipedalianism, 17 amphi-
goric analecta, 18 and even serendipitous cyberspatial sciolism 19 in an ef-
fort to present a fresh approach. 
But the other words in my title are less revealing. For example, 
who is this "patron saint" there referred to? It is me, as I discovered 
back in 1988 when, while digging through the advance sheets for 
Fourth Amendment minutiae, I discovered a case in which I was char-
acterized as "the patron saint of the Fourth Amendment. " 20 I rather 
liked that appellation and looked forward to springing it on my col-
leagues and friends at the earliest opportunity. Unfortunately, in the in-
14. On occasion, even these student pieces have surfaced in later years and have 
then been identified as having been authored by "Professor LaFave." See, e.g., United 
States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane), revd., 414 U.S. 218 
(1973). How fortunate I was, then, that my law school mentor, Professor Frank 
Remington, kept my feet to the fire until I got those student works up to snuff. See 
Wayne R. LaFave, Frank Remington: The Man and His Work, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 570, 
573-74. 
15. Rigid adherence to law review protocol would necessitate a cataloguing here 
of each and every one of these pieces, including those I have completely forgotten 
about I have decided to forgo such a laundry list, however, on the theory that its ab-
sence will make me appear humble. Anyway, I can sneak in references to some of them 
in other footnotes. 
16. Wayne R. Lafave, A Fourth Amendment Fantasy: The Last (Heretofore Un-
published) Search and Seizure Decision of the Burger Court, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 669. 
17. Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pacyhermatous Prey: Whence 
Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 729. 
18. LaFave, supra note 12. 
19. Wayne R. LaFave, Surfing as Scholarship: The Emerging Critical Cyberspace 
Studies Movement, 84 GEO. LJ. 521 (1996). 
20. Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (Clinton, J., dis-
senting). Because this appears in a dissenting opinion, I hasten to add that it is part of a 
statement noting that I was quoted at length in the majority opinion. It should not be er-
roneously assumed, therefore, that the majority at some point asserted that I was not a 
saint, patron or otherwise. 
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tervening years I have never found just the right opportunity to work it 
into the conversation, which is why my sainthood has until now re-
mained a deep, dark secret. 
Perhaps I should have left it that way, for what I originally per-
ceived as a significant milestone in my professional developll).ent has 
become instead a millstone around my neck. The title "patron saint" is 
not a mere honorific, for such a person is charged with the awesome re-
sponsibility of supporting and protecting the person or thing that is the 
patronee. But if you look at what has happened during my watch, it is 
apparent that I have been a resounding failure in this regard. Certainly 
my fellow Fourth Amendment buffs are of that view, for the very titles 
of their writings lament a "shrinking"21 (indeed, "incredibly shrink-
ing"22) and even "dying"23 Fourth Amendment that has been subjected 
to such "attack,"24 "emasculation,"25 "dismantling,"26 "pruning,"27 
"erosion"28 (even "steady erosion"29), "freezing,"30 "descent,"31 
"fall"32 and even "junking"33 that it has become a "casualty"34 or 
21. Robert Angell, Note, California v. Acevedo and the Shrinking Fourth Amend-
ment, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 707 (1992). 
22. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredibly Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.. 
CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984). 
23. K.S. Berk, Recent Development, State v. Landry: Is the Fourth Amendment 
Dying?, 61 TUL. L. REv. 323 (1992). 
24. Craig Steven Michalk, Case Comment, Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 
(1990): The Supreme Court's Latest Attack on Fourth Amendment Protections Against 
Warrantless Searches, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 333 (1991). 
25. Jessica Forbes, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, 
and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1221 (1987). 
26. Lynn S. Searle, Note, The "Administrative" Search from Dewey to Burger: 
Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261 (1989). 
27. Duncan Simpson, Casenote, California v. Greenwood: The Pruning of the 
Fourth Amendment, 35 LOY. L. REv. 549 (1989). 
28. Amy B. Beller, Comment, United States v. MacDonald: The Exigent Circum-
stances Exception and the Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407 
(1991). 
29. Kathleen M. Ghreichi, Note, James v. Illinois: An Unexpected Departure from 
the Steady Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 22 U. ToL. L. REv. 
839 (1991). 
30. Sean R. O'Brien, Note, United States v. Leon and the Freezing of the Fourth 
Amendment, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1305 (1993). 
31. Jon Gavenman, Comment, Florida v. Riley: The Descent of Fourth Amendment 
Protections in Aerial Surveillance Cases, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725 (1990). 
32. Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 
25 VAL. U. L. REv. 383 (1991). 
33. John S. Morgan, Comment, The Junking of the Fourth Amendment: Illinois v. 
Krull and New York v. Burger, 63 TUL. L. REv. 335 (1988). 
34. Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment-An-
other Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 601. 
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"victim"35 to which we can "say goodbye,"36 at least absent much-
needed "resuscitating."37 And that brings me to the word "confes-
sions" in the present article's title; it refers to my forthright acknowl-
edgment here and now that I have failed miserably in my tutelary 
obligations. 
I tried! There is, after all, my own trail of law review articles (fee-
ble attempts, perhaps, to prevent or at least forestall the unfortunate 
consequences chronicled above). And there is also my multivolume 
Search and Seizure treatise, the work that actually prompted the confer-
ral of sainthood upon this humble servant. Published in its three-volume 
first edition in 1978, its four-volume second edition in 1987, and its 
five-volume third edition in 1996, the treatise by its growth might be 
thought to reflect a corresponding broadening of Fourth Amendment 
rights. But in fact, as noted earlier, those rights seem to be diminish-
ing.38 The growth of the treatise, then, says more about the phenomenon 
of treatise-writing39 than about the Fourth Amendment itself: clearly, I 
have been writing more and more about less and less. 
This movement to less and less, it seems to me, is attributable to 
several disturbing trends in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence. For one thing, the varieties of police conduct to which the 
Court deems the Amendment to be applicable are unrealistically cir-
cumscribed. Second, as to that conduct to which the Amendment does 
apply, the evidentiary grounds - whether probable cause in the tradi-
tional sense or some lesser standard - have been softened or dimin-
35. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amend-
ment (as Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
36. Thomas L. Liotti & Henry R. Fasano, Pretext Without Precedent- Say Good-
bye to the Fourth Amendment, 67 N.Y.ST. BJ., Jan. 1995, at 40. 
37. Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. R.Ev. 473 (1991). 
38. Which has prompted some, such as my colleague Don Dripps, who takes no 
small delight in torturing me, to question why the treatise has not evaporated down to a 
single volume. 
39. Professor Anthony Amsterdam has recounted 
the progress of the apocryphal author of the celebrated treatise called Jones on 
Easements. The first sentence of the first edition began: "There are fourteen 
kinds of easements recognized by the law of England." But the work was well 
received, and the author labored to produce a second edition, in two volumes, 
which necessarily began: "There are thirty-nine kinds of easements." After the 
author's death, the treatise was scrupulously updated by his literary scions and 
now appears in a solid 12~volume sixth edition beginning with the sentence: "It 
is impossible to say how many kinds of easements are recognized by the law of 
England." 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. R.Ev. 
349, 37~75 (1974). 
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ished unnecessarily. Warrants are now deemed unnecessary in a great 
many instances in which no exigency is present, but without a princi-
pled explanation for abandoning the earlier doctrine that prior judicial 
approval of searches and seizures is strongly preferred. Finally, the 
principal device for enforcing the Amendment, the exclusionary rule, 
has been narrowed unrealistically because of a rather distorted view by 
the Court of the deterrence function. 
I have elaborated on each of those four trends on prior occasions,40 
and shall not undertake to do so again here. Rather, I shall follow a 
more focused approach now, as I want to examine closely two cases 
from the Term ended in 1995 that illustrate the course that the Supreme 
Court has taken. These cases, Arizona v. Evans41 and Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton,42 involved, respectively, the fourth and second of 
the trends briefly described above. In Evans, the exclusionary rule was 
pulled back one more notch by a holding that it does not apply in the 
case of an illegal arrest attributable to the negligence of a court clerk.43 
In Acton, drug testing without individualized suspicion was upheld upon 
a purported showing of need that, in fact, was much weaker in both 
kind and degree than that deemed sufficient in the Court's earlier 
decisions. 44 
For those of you still perplexed about the words "computers" and 
"urinals" in this article's title, I can now also reveal that the first of 
these cases concerns nonperformance at a computer, and the second 
nonperformance at a urinal. How? Read on! 
CO:MPUTERS, CLERKS, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
In New Jersey v. T.L.0.,45 the Supreme Court unequivocally estab-
lished that public employees other than law enforcement officers are 
also subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment. But this de-
cision gave rise to another question that had theretofore rarely surfaced 
in the appellate cases:46 Even if such persons are subject to the Fourth 
Amendment, does it follow that the exclusionary rule is an appropriate 
40. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: "Second to None in the Bill of 
Rights," 75 ILL. BJ. 424 (1987); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today: A 
Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1061 (1987). 
41. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995). 
42. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). 
43. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189. 
44. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. 
45. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
46. Most likely because its very existence seemed to be denied by the Supreme 
Court, which in the main "treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as 
synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured incident to 
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sanction when they violate the Fourth Amendment? Because the search 
at issue in T.L.O. was then found to be reasonable, the Court carefully 
avoided expressing any opinion on this question as to high school ad-
ministrators, even though that issue had prompted the original grant of 
certiorari. 47 
That certain nonpolice government actors are not in such need of 
deterrence as to be appropriate objects of the exclusionary sanction was 
a critical assumption by the Supreme Court in developing the "good 
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon,48 
holding admissible evidence obtained in execution of a facially valid 
search warrant grounded in an affidavit later found to be lacking proba-
ble cause, the Court ruled that "the extreme sanction of exclusion" was 
"inappropriate. " 49 There was no need to deter the police where, as here, 
they had in good faith relied upon the warrant, and there was also no 
need to deter the warrant-issuing judiciary, for "there exists no evi-
dence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or 
subvert the Fourth Amendment."50 By similar reasoning, the Court later 
held in Illinois v. Krull51 that exclusion was unnecessary when police 
searched in reasonable reliance upon statutory authorization. This time 
the Court stressed that there was "nothing to indicate that applying the 
exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to the statute prior to the 
declaration of its invalidity will act as a significant, additional deter-
rent"52 on legislators enacting such statutes. This "Leon framework," 
as the Court put it, was next used in the first case receiving principal at-
tention here, Arizona v. Evans,53 where again the police conducted the 
actual search but the assumed Fourth Amendment violation54 was attrib-
utable to the conduct of a court clerk. 
In Evans, a police officer stopped the defendant in January of 1991 
for a traffic violation and then entered his name into a computer data 
terminal located in his patrol car. When the computer indicated that 
that violation." Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192 (referring specifically to the Court's approach 
in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)). 
47. See T.L.0., 469 U.S. at 327. 
48. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
49. 468 U.S. at 926. 
50. 468 U.S. at 916. 
51. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
52. 480 U.S. at 352. 
53. 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1193 (1995). 
54. The State conceded that Evans's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, so the 
Court "decline[d] to review that determination," 115 S. Ct. at 1189 n.1, namely, that an 
arrest is unreasonable when made in response to a computer entry of an outstanding 
warrant that is in error because a court clerk failed to communicate the quashing of that 
warrant to the law enforcement authorities. 
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there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for Evans's arrest, the 
officer placed him under arrest and incident thereto found a bag of ma-
rijuana in the car. Testimony at the suppression hearing established that 
an arrest warrant had issued on December 13, 1990, because Evans had 
failed to appear to answer for several traffic violations, but that on De-
cember 19, 1990, a justice of the peace ordered the warrant quashed 
when Evans then appeared in court. The standard procedure in such a 
case was for a justice court clerk to inform the· sheriff's office that the 
warrant had been quashed, so that the sheriff's office then could remove 
the warrant from its computer records; this practice apparently was not 
followed in Evans's case.55 The trial court granted Evans's motion to 
suppress because the State had been at fault in failing to quash the war-
rant. The state court of appeals reversed on the ground that the exclu-
sionary rule was inapplicable to public employees "not directly associ-
ated with the arresting officers or the arresting officers' police 
department. " 56 The state supreme court in turn reversed the appellate 
court's decision.57 
Then it was the Supreme Court's turn. After surveying earlier deci-
sions of the Court supporting the proposition that the exclusionary 
rule's application is "restricted to those instances where its remedial 
objectives are thought most efficaciously served,"58 the Evans majority 
said: 
Applying the reasoning of Leon to the facts of this case, we con-
clude that the decision of the Arizona Supreme court must be reversed. 
The Arizona Supreme Court determined that it could not "support the 
distinction drawn . . . between clerical errors committed by law enforce-
ment personnel and similar mistakes by court employees," and that 
"even assuming ... that responsibility for the error rested with the jus-
tice court, it does not follow that the exclusionary rule should be inappli-
cable to these facts." 
This holding is contrary to the reasoning of Leon . . . and Krull. If 
court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer record, the 
exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so 
as to warrant such a severe sanction. First, as we noted in Leon, the ex-
clusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police 
misconduct, not mistakes by court employees. Second, respondent offers 
55. As the Supreme Court noted, "there was no indication in respondent's file that 
a clerk had called and notified the Sheriff's Office," and "the Sheriff's Office had no 
record of a telephone call informing it that respondent's arrest warrant had been 
quashed." 115 S. Ct. at 1188. 
56. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (citing United 
States v. Leon, 408 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)). 
57. See State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994). 
58. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191. 
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no evidence that court employees are inclined to ignore or subvert the 
Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires ap-
plication of the extreme sanction of exclusion. . . . 
Finally, and most important, there is no basis for believing that ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a sig-
nificant effect on court employees responsible for informing the police 
that a warrant has been quashed. Because court clerks are not adjuncts to 
the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime, they have no stake in the outcome of particular crim-
inal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion of evidence could not be ex-
pected to deter such individuals from failing to inform police officials 
that a warrant had been quashed. 
If it were indeed a court clerk who was responsible for the errone-
ous entry on the police computer, application of the exclusionary rule 
also could not be expected to alter the behavior of the arresting officer. 
As the trial court in this case stated: "I think the police officer [was] 
bound to arrest. I think he would [have been] derelict in his duty if he 
failed to arrest." . . . There is no indication that the arresting officer was 
not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police com-
puter record.59 
The reasoning in the Leon case is extremely vulnerable on several 
different levels and from several different perspectives.60 Because Evans 
purports to follow that reasoning, certainly the rationale of Evans is no 
less shaky. Indeed, the Evans case, if anything, has even less going for 
it than Leon; one could even fully accept the holding in Leon and still 
conclude that the Evans decision is dead wrong, as Justice Stevens 
noted in dissent: 
The Leon Court's exemption of judges and magistrates from the deterrent 
ambit of the exclusionary rule rested, consistently with the emphasis on 
the warrant requirement, on those officials' constitutionally determined 
role in issuing warrants. Taken on its own terms, Leon's logic does not 
59. 115 S. Ct. at 1193-94 (alterations to quotations in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Evans, 866 P.2d at 871; Joint Appendix at 51, Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (No. 93-
1660) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]). This quotation is from the majority opinion of the 
Chief Justice. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, concurring, opined that in cases 
such as this it still could be questioned whether the police "acted reasonably in their re-
liance on the recordkeeping system itself." 115 S. Ct. at 1194. Justices Souter and 
Breyer, in another concurrence, emphasized that the Court had not yet determined 
whether, at least in this context, "our very concept of deterrence by exclusion of evi-
dence should extend to the government as a whole, not merely the police." 115 S. Ct. 
at 1195. Justice Stevens, dissenting, disagreed generally on the merits. See 115 S. Ct. at 
1197. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, in another dissent, focused primarily on the ques-
tion of whether there was a basis for the Court to assert jurisdiction in this case, but 
also questioned the majority's assumptions about what effect exclusion would have in 
this kind of case. See 115 S. Ct. at 1200 & n.5, 1201-02. 
60. See 1 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 1.3 (3d ed. 1996). 
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extend to the time after the warrant has issued; nor does it extend to 
court clerks and functionaries, some of whom work in the same building 
with police officers and may have more regular and direct contact with 
police than with judges or magistrates.61 
This distinction was appreciated by the state supreme court, which 
cogently noted that while "it may be inappropriate to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule where a magistrate has issued a facially valid warrant (a 
discretionary judicial function) . . . it is useful and proper to do so 
where negligent record keeping (a purely clerical function) results in an 
unlawful arrest. " 62 By comparison, the Rehnquist opinion in Evans un-
equivocally asserts that it would not be "useful and proper" to exclude 
the evidence in that case because exclusion would (1) neither deter 
clerks from such errors (2) nor alter the behavior of arresting officers. 
Closer analysis of the latter two assertions and the assumptions appar-
ently underlying them serves to demonstrate further what is wrong with 
the Evans rationale. 
First, the Evans majority seems to say that exclusion is not neces-
sary to deter clerks because there is nothing to deter. Why? Because 
there is no basis for concluding that "court employees are inclined to 
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment. " 63 If, as seems the case, the 
word "inclined" is being used here in its usual sense of reflecting one's 
state of mind, the Court's reasoning appears to include the notion that 
deterrence cannot operate upon instances of inaction by inadvertence. 
But this is not so. As the Ginsburg opinion in Evans put it, the sugges-
tion "that an exclusionary rule cannot deter carelessness, but can affect 
only intentional or reckless misconduct[,] ... runs counter to a premise 
underlying all of negligence law - that imposing liability for negli-
gence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to act with greater 
care."64 
Nor is the Court's assumption correct as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment theory. In stating that "court employees" - in contrast, 
apparently, to the police - are not "inclined to ignore or subvert the 
Fourth Amendment," the implication is that these court employees, 
who, the Court reminds us, are not "engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime, " 65 hardly are motivated to undertake 
calculated intrusions upon Fourth Amendment interests and conse-
quently are unworthy objects of the exclusionary rule and its deterrence 
61. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1196 (citation omitted). 
62. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994). 
63. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193. 
64. 115 S. Ct. at 1200 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
65. 115 S. Ct. at 1193 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
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function. But surely the exclusionary rule should not be so limited, as 
certainly many more violations of the Fourth Amendment are the result 
of carelessness than of deliberate misconduct. And just as surely the ex-
clusionary rule is directed logically at those more common types of vio-
lations; as it was put in Stone v. Powell, the exclusionary rule demon-
strates "that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of 
constitutional rights," and thereby encourages public officers whose ac-
tions bear on the malting of searches and seizures "to incorporate 
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system. " 66 To put the pro-
position another way, if the exclusionary rule, as stated in United States 
v. Johnson,61 provides an "incentive to err on the side of constitutional 
behavior," then it is an appropriate tool for preventing carelessness by 
court clerks. 
Second, in asserting that exclusion of evidence on the facts of 
Evans "would not sufficiently deter future errors"68 of the same kind, 
part of the Court's thinking seems to be that future errors will be so in-
frequent that there is virtually nothing to deter. This is highlighted by 
the fact that in the very same paragraph the Court sets out the testimony 
of the chief clerk to the effect that "this type of error occurred once 
every three or four years. " 69 But the relevance and accuracy of the 
Court's assumption are certainly open to question. For one thing, it is 
curious at best to explain the withdrawal of the exclusionary rule in 
terms of the expected infrequency of its application. As Justice Stevens 
points out in his dissent, "even if errors in computer records of war-
rants were rare, that would merely minimize the cost of enforcing the 
exclusionary rule in cases like this. " 7° For another, it is by no means 
apparent that such errors are so rare that their recurrence need not be 
deterred. As Justice Stevens also notes, the chief clerk "promptly con-
tradicted herself"71 and admitted that three other errors of the same 
kind occurred the very same day that Evans's warrant notice was not 
canceled. This fact means, he cogently adds, that there was "slim evi-
dence on which to base a conclusion that computer error poses no ap-
preciable threat to Fourth Amendment interests. " 72 From a broader per-
spective - nationwide, and not just in the "particular court"73 about 
66. 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976). 
67. 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982). 
68. Evans, 115 S. Ct at 1193. 
69. 115 S. Ct. at 1193 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 59, at 37). 
70. 115 S. Ct. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71. 115 S. Ct. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
72. 115 S. Ct. at 1196-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
73. 115 S. Ct. at 1196 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 59, at 37). 
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which the chief clerk testified - there is reason to believe that illegal 
arrests attributable to computer error are no small problem.74 It is thus 
fair to conclude, as did Justice Ginsburg, that "Evans' case is not 
idiosyncratic. " 75 
The Evans majority's reliance upon the supposed insignificant 
number of such computer errors is objectionable for another reason: it 
fails to take into account the dimensions of the risk to Fourth Amend-
ment values that even a single such error creates. When at a particular 
time and place a particular police officer unreasonably interprets the ob-
served circumstances and makes an arrest that ought not have been 
made, that is bad enough, but at least it is a single event with rather 
narrow time-place-occasion dimensions. But a mistake of the kind at is-
sue in Evans is quite a different matter - "computerization greatly am-
plifies an error's effect," as "inaccurate data can infect not only one 
agency, but the many agencies that share access to the database. " 76 
Such errors can result in the object of the erroneous information being 
arrested repeatedly,77 and make that individual a "marked man" subject 
to illegal arrest "anywhere," "at any time," and "into the indefinite 
future. " 78 
74. Cases of this genre are reaching the appellate courts with increasing frequency. 
And they are doubtless only the tip of the iceberg; surely there are many more evi-
dence-producing illegal arrests caused by erroneous computer records that are disposed 
of at the trial level. Even that does not reflect the total dimensions of the problem, for 
certainly in this context the supposition of Justice Jackson is especially apt - "that 
there are, many unlawful searches ... of innocent people which turn up nothing incrim-
inating ... about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear." Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
75. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
76. 115 S. Ct. at 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg continued: 
The computerized databases of the FBI's National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC), to take a conspicuous example, contain over 23 million records, identify-
ing, among other things, persons and vehicles sought by law enforcement agen-
cies nationwide. NCIC information is available to approximately 71,000 federal, 
state, and local agencies. Thus, any mistake entered into the NCIC spreads na-
tionwide in an instant. 
115 S. Ct. at 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
77. See, e.g., Finch v. Chapman, 785 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (misinforma-
tion long retained in NCIC records resulted in plaintiff being arrested and detained 
twice); Rogan v. Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (as a result of misin-
formation in computer records, plaintiff was wrongfully arrested four times, three times 
at gunpoint, after traffic stops in Michigan and Oklahoma). 
78. In United States v. Mackey, discussed in Judith J. Rentschler, Note, Garbage 
In, Gospel Out, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 509 (1976), the court stated: 
Because of the inaccurate listing in the NCIC computer, defendant was a 
"marked man" for the five months prior to his arrest, and, had this particular 
identification check not occurred, he would have continued in this status into the 
indefinite future. At any time ... a routine check by the police could well result 
2566 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2553 
The Evans majority ignores all of this and as a consequence misses 
a compelling reason why this is an inauspicious occasion for withdraw-
ing the exclusionary sanction. Given "the advent of powerful, 
computer-based recordkeeping systems that facilitate arrests in ways 
that have never before been possible," the "benefits of more efficient 
law enforcement mechanisms" carry with them a "burden of corre-
sponding constitutional responsibilities"79 that ought not be trivialized 
by withdrawal of the exclusionary rule. The Arizona Supreme Court 
had it right: "As automation increasingly invades modem life, the po-
tential for Orwellian mischief grows. Under such circumstances, the ex-
clusionary rule is a 'cost' we cannot afford to be without. " 80 
Third, yet another aspect of the Evans majority's no-deterrence-of-
clerks theme is the notion that such officials simply are not deterable, at 
least by this kind of sanction. The point, as they put it, is that the 
"threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such in-
dividuals" because "they have no stake in the outcome of particular 
criminal prosecutions. " 81 If this rationale sounds familiar, it is because 
the Court has used it before, most notably in Leon as to warrant-issuing 
judges. It made no sense there, for the characterization of such a judge 
as a "neutral and detached magistrate" hardly means that he is so disin-
terested in his responsibilities as to not be fazed by the prospect that an 
erroneous decision on his part could adversely affect a future criminal 
prosecution. Much the same point can be made here. It is doubtless true 
that there are some public employees whose duties are so far removed 
from the criminal justice system and so seldom an occasion for uncov-
ering evidence of criminal conduct that the risk of evidence suppression 
will never have occasion to influence their conduct. 82 But surely a court 
clerk whose responsibilities include ensuring that law enforcement 
records are kept current is not so situated. Such an individual is a part 
of the criminal justice system, and as such hardly can be totally disin-
terested in how that system works - including whether his own dere-
lictions might cause evidence to be suppressed and perpetrators to be 
released. 
in defendant's arrest, booking, search and detention. . . . Moreover, this could 
happen anywhere in the United States where law enforcement officers had access 
to NCIC information. Defendant was subject to being deprived of his liberty at 
any time and without any legal basis. 
United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (D. Nev. 1975). 
79. Evans, 115 S. Ct at 1195 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
80. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994). 
81. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193. 
82. See, e.g., cases discussed infra note 174. 
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But even if the level of deterrence that can be achieved vis-a-vis 
court clerks is limited somewhat, it hardly follows that Evans was de-
cided rightly. For one thing - as will be elaborated a bit later, because 
it relates most directly to the Evans majority's most egregious error in 
analysis - such lack of deterrence is hardly determinative, as the 
proper focus is upon systemic deterrence rather than deterrence of a 
particular actor in the criminal justice system. For another, as important 
as deterrence is, it should not be the exclusive determinant of the exclu-
sionary rule's dimensions. Exclusion also serves as a means "of assur-
ing the people - all potential victims of unlawful government conduct 
- that the government will not profit from its lawless behavior. " 83 Put 
another way, it may be said that exclusion is appropriate precisely be-
cause it places the government in the same position as if it had not con-
ducted the illegal search and seizure in the first place. 84 Such return to 
the status quo ante is especially compelling in the present situation, 
where the actual facts known within the criminal justice system prior to 
the arrest and search make it apparent that those actions lacked even a 
remotely arguable justification, meaning that the acquisition of evidence 
of the arrestee's criminality cannot be characterized as anything but a 
complete windfall. Even if the exclusionary rule must be trimmed at the 
edges a la Leon, so that the prosecution rather than the defendant wins 
in certain instances of close-case illegality - for example, when the 
search warrant affidavit is sufficiently close to showing probable cause 
that the police were justified in relying on the magistrate's mistaken 
conclusion that probable cause was present - it hardly follows that the 
defendant also should lose in cases like Evans, where the quashed war-
rant totally deprives the arrest and search of any legitimacy. 
Finally, even if none of the foregoing criticisms of Evans are 
deemed compelling, there remains one more characteristic of the major-
ity opinion that demonstrates the error of the Court's holding. This fun-
damental defect is that the Evans majority confines the exclusionary 
rule's deterrence function within much too narrow a compass. The 
Court looks only at the deterrence of "court clerks" and "the arresting 
officer"85 and then concludes there is no deterrence to be had on the 
facts of Evans. Instead, the Court ought to have occupied itself with the 
matter of systemic deterrence: whether exclusion could be expected to 
83. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
84. Cf. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, De-
velopment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1400 (1983). 
85. Evans, 115 S. Ct at 1193. 
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influence changes in the criminal justice system that would eliminate or 
greatly reduce future illegal arrests on phantom warrants. 
One consequence of the Evans majority's narrow focus is that the 
Court has drawn a rather bold line between the police and nonpolice ac-
tors in the system, when in real life no such line exists. As a general 
matter, it is fair to say that our processes of criminal justice are best un-
derstood if viewed as they actually are: a system of interlocking stages 
and agencies, rather than discrete bits and pieces.86 This is particularly 
true as to the matters here under consideration, as Justice Ginsburg's 
dissent in Evans so aptly illustrates: 
In this electronic age, particularly with respect to record.keeping, 
court personnel and police officers are not neatly compartmentalized ac-
tors. Instead, they serve together to carry out the State's information-
gathering objectives. Whether particular records are maintained by the 
police or the courts should not be dispositive where a single computer 
database can answer all calls. Not only is it artificial to distinguish be-
tween court clerk and police clerk slips; in practice, it may be difficult to 
pinpoint whether one official, e.g., a court employee, or another, e.g., a 
police officer, caused the error to exist or persist. Applying an exclusion-
ary rule as the Arizona court did may well supply a powerful incentive to 
the State to promote the prompt updating of computer records. 87 
Moreover, if such an artificial distinction is avoided, then it be-
comes more apparent that the necessary incentive need not come from 
the court clerks themselves, or even from their immediate judicial or 
administrative supervisors. It might just as logically, if not more logi-
cally, come from the police. Justice Stevens has it right then when he 
suggests in his dissent that "[w]e should reasonably presume that law 
enforcement officials, who stand in the best position to monitor such er-
rors as occurred here, can influence mundane communication proce-
dures in order to prevent those errors."88 
If the police can do so, the next question is whether the application 
or nonapplication of the exclusionary rule in Evans-type situations -
where a warrant check is run incident to a traffic stop, an arrest is made 
because the computer indicates that there is an outstanding warrant, but 
it is later learned there is no warrant - has anything to do with 
whether they will do so. The answer is yes, as can been seen by assess-
ing the competing incentives upon the police regarding the timely and 
accurate updating of their computer records. While Justice Ginsburg's 
86. See Lloyd E. Ohlin, Surveying Discretion by Criminal Justice Decision Mak-
ers, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 9-12 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Rem-
ington eds., 1993). 
87. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1200 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
88. 115 S. Ct. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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analysis quoted above speaks of the exclusionary rule as providing an 
incentive to prevent such illegal arrests, that is not quite correct. Rather, 
it is properly said, as the Court put it in Elkins v. United States,89 that 
the exclusionary rule deters Fourth Amendment violations by "remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it." Thus, if we want to identify an incen-
tive on the police department to seek greater accuracy in their computer 
records and thus fewer illegal arrests, it would be more appropriate to 
focus upon certain pragmatic considerations, such as that the police can 
best conserve their scarce patrol resources if officers do not spend their 
time, including all the postarrest processing ordinarily required, making 
unnecessary arrests pursuant to nonexistent warrants. 
Although that might not seem like a powerful incentive, it proba-
bly is good enough if there is not a more compelling incentive pulling 
in the direction of not doing anything to minimize the chances of such 
illegal arrests. If and only if the exclusionary rule is inapplicable here, 
there is likely to be such a countervailing incentive: such an illegal ar-
rest will sometimes provide a substantial windfall in the form of evi-
dence of ongoing criminality by the arrestee, just as in Evans. Though it 
might be contended that the chance of occasional windfalls would not 
be enough to make the police disinterested in greater oversight of the 
clerks to keep the records straight, I doubt it. Those doubts are strength-
ened by the fact that the potential for similar windfalls already has had 
a profound influence upon police policymaking. Police agencies all 
across the country have adopted the tactic of using traffic stops, some-
times for the most insignificant of violations, as a device for seeking 
out drugs and weapons whenever possible, such as when the detained 
driver can be induced to consent to a vehicle search or when a record 
check provides an apparent basis for arrest and an incidental search. 90 In 
the context of such programs, a higher level of illegal arrests because of 
89. 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1990) (citing Eleuteri v. Richman, 141 A.2d 46, 50 (N.J.), 
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958)). 
90. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Present and Future Fourth Amendment, 1995 U. 
ILL. L. R.Ev. 111, 117-21. This is not to suggest that every traffic offense, no matter 
how minor, is dealt with in this way. Rather, this procedure is reserved for those the po-
lice on a "hunch" believe might be in possession of drugs or weapons, but the basis for 
the hunch is seldom made visible in such a way that would afford the defendant a basis 
for challenging the police action. These hunches are based upon a variety of factors, in-
cluding the race of the driver. See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 
1993) (state trooper, after noticing van had four black occupants, stopped vehicle be-
cause driver failed to signal a lane change where no other moving vehicle was in sight), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1230 (1994). No wonder, then, that "[t]here's a moving viola-
tion that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black." Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEW YORKER. Oct. 23, 
1995, at 56, 59. 
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clerical errors is likely to appear advantageous rather than disadvanta-
geous if there is no risk that the windfall evidence will be suppressed, 
especially since the nature of the illegality will be such that the arrest-
ing officer cannot be faulted for having made those arrests. Indeed, after 
Evans the police will in no sense be troubled by the thought that these 
windfalls are being gained only at the cost of violating the constitu-
tional rights of citizens, for arrests made upon false computer records 
no longer will be viewed as illegal arrests. This is because, as the Su-
preme Court fully recognized in Terry v. Ohio, "admitting evidence in a 
criminal trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct 
which produced the evidence. " 91 No wonder, then, that after Evans 
there is little likelihood that police agencies aggressively will seek bet-
ter recordkeeping about outstanding warrants. 
URINALS, STUDENTS, AND SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES 
The Supreme Court dealt with public school searches for the first 
time in New Jersey v. T.L.0.92 In upholding a search by a high school 
administrator of a student's purse, the Court concluded that a proper 
"accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the 
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain 
order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement 
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of 
the search has violated or is violating the law. " 93 Rather, the Court con-
tinued, the legality of such a search should depend simply on its reason-
ableness both in terms of justification and scope: 
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other 
school official will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasona-
ble grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the 
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the 
school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not ex-
cessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the na-
ture of the infraction.94 
However, the Court also intimated that a school search without individ-
ualized suspicion would pass muster if the "privacy interests implicated 
by a search are minimal and where 'other safeguards' are available 'to 
91. 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). 
92. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
93. 469 U.S. at 341. 
94. 469 U.S. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
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assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not sub-
ject to the discretion of the official in the field.' " 95 
When the Court later had occasion to deal with drug testing of stu-
dents in Vernonia School District 471 v. Acton,96 this turned out to be 
the case. At issue in Acton was a drug-testing program established by 
the school district upon a determination that there had been a sharp in-
crease in drug use by students and that athletes were the leaders of the 
drug culture. Under the program, students wishing to play sports were 
allowed to participate only if they and their parents consented to the 
testing of those students. The athletes were tested at the beginning of 
the season for their sport, and in addition each week of the season ten 
percent of the athletes were selected at random for further testing. The 
testing was done under circumstances that limited the intrusion on pri-
vacy, and the test results were made available only to a few school offi-
cials. The only use of a positive test result was that the student was 
tested again, and if a second positive result was obtained the student 
was required to opt for either a six-week assistance program, including 
weekly urinalysis, or suspension from athletics, except that repeat of-
fenders were given only the second option. When seventh-grader James 
Acton refused to perform as required at the urinal, he was denied partic-
ipation in his school's football program. He and his parents then filed 
suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court denied the 
claims, but the court of appeals reversed. 
The Acton majority's97 balancing process, resulting in the conclu-
sion that the above-described program "is reasonable and hence consti-
tutional, "98 consisted of an assessment of three factors: (1) "the nature 
of the privacy interest upon which the search here at issue intrudes";99 
(2) "the character of the intrusion that is complained of"; 100 and (3) 
"the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, 
and the efficacy of the means for meeting it." 101 As for the first factor, 
the Court concluded that it was dealing with a situation as to which 
there was clearly a "decreased expectation of privacy." 102 In large mea-
sure, this involved nothing more than a straightforward application of 
95. 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979) 
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1987))). 
96. 115 S. Ct 2386 (1995). 
97. The Court split 6-3; Justice Scalia wrote for the majority; Justice O'Connor for 
the dissenters. 
98. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. 
99. 115 S. Ct. at 2391. 
100. 115 S. Ct. at 2393. 
101. 115 S. Ct. at 2394. 
102. 115 S. Ct. at 2396. 
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T.L.0.: drawing upon the conclusion in that case that "a proper educa-
tional environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren," 103 the 
Acton majority reiterated that those children may be subjected to "a de-
gree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free 
adults." 104 But another consideration was also deemed important liere: 
"Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student 
athletes." 105 After all, "school locker rooms . . . are not notable for the 
privacy they afford." 106 Moreover, students who choose to participate in 
athletics "voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even 
higher than that imposed on students generally," much "like adults who 
choose to participate in a 'closely regulated industry.' " 107 
As for the second factor, the character of the intrusion at issue, the 
Court in Acton stressed the "relative unobtrusiveness" 108 of this testing 
process, which the Court had previously held constitutes a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.109 First of all, there was "the 
manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored," which 
in the instant case occurred under conditions "nearly identical to those 
typically encountered in public restrooms. " 110 As for what was dis-
closed, the Court stressed that the tests "look only for drugs" and that 
the results "are disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel 
who have a need to know" and "are not turned over to law enforce-
ment authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function." 111 Al-
though the requirement that students "identify in advance prescription 
medications they are taking" in order to provide a basis for spotting 
false positives was "some cause for concern," 112 the Court dismissed 
this problem with the explanation that it was not established that such 
advance disclosure was unavoidable.113 
103. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). 
104. Acton, 115 S. Ct at 2392. 
105. 115 S. Ct at 2392. 
106. 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93. 
107. 115 S. Ct at 2393. 
108. 115 S. Ct. at 2396. 
109. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
110. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626). As the Court 
elaborated, "male students produce samples at a urinal along a wall. They remain fully 
clothed and are only observed from behind, if at all. Female students produce samples 
in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside listening only for sounds of 
tampering." 115 S. Ct at 2393. 
111. 115 S. Ct. at 2393. 
112. 115 S. Ct. at 2394. 
113. The Court noted that while such advance disclosure was the practice, it was 
not required by the written policy of the District, and added that "when respondents 
choose, in effect, to challenge the Policy on its face, we will not assume the worst." 
115 S. Ct. at 2394. 
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As for the third factor, the need side of the balancing test, the 
Acton majority began with the cogent observation that this government 
interest did not have to meet some "fixed, minimum quantum of gov-
ernmental concern," but merely had to be "important enough to justify 
the particular search at hand," 114 considering the degree of its intrusive-
ness.115 "Deterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren," the Court 
reasoned, was "at least as important" as the interest served by the drug 
testings previously upheld by the Court, especially when it is consid-
ered that "the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon 
the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educa-
tional process is disrupted." 116 Moreover, because the program at issue 
was limited to school athletes, there was also the need to respond to 
"the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with 
whom he is playing his sport." 117 The record in this case, the Acton ma-
jority added, reflected "the immediacy of the District's concerns"118 re-
garding those problems. And the efficacy of the means the District had 
adopted to respond to those concerns was "self-evident," for by the 
testing they were "making sure that athletes do not use drugs" and in-
directly were treating the broader "drug problem largely fueled by the 
'role model' effect of athletes' drug use." 119 
In general terms, at least, there is no reason to quarrel with the 
analysis summarized above. Use of the balancing test is appropriate 
here, and it is fair to conclude that the specific factors in the balance 
here - (1) a "decreased expectation of privacy" by student athletes, 
(2) the "relative unobtrusiveness" of the testing process, and (3) the 
"severity of the need" met by that testing - collectively support a re-
gime of drug testing.120 Even the three dissenters in Acton agree on 
these points.121 But that leaves unresolved what is truly the central and 
114. 115 S. Ct. at 2394-95. 
115. The Court apparently deemed it necessary to emphasize this point because in 
its prior drug-testing cases it had characterized the government interest motivating the 
search as "compelling." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 
628 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 
(1989). 
116. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. 
117. 115 S. Ct. at 2395. 
118. 115 S. Ct. at 2395. 
119. 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96. 
120. See 115 S. Ct. at 2396. 
121. Except in one respect. On the matter of need in this particular case, as re-
flected by the record made below, they agree that "the record in this case surely dem-
onstrates there was a drug-related discipline problem in Vernonia of 'epidemic propor-
tions,' " but find that the "evidence of a drug-related sports injury problem at Vernonia, 
by contrast, was considerably weaker." 115 S. Ct. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)). 
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most difficult issue in Acton: whether the constitutionally permissible 
testing on such facts is the blanket-random scheme that was used, or in-
stead testing of particular students on a reasonable suspicion basis as 
the objecting student, Acton, claimed. The majority responded to that 
claim in these words: 
We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the "least intrusive" 
search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Re-
spondents' alternative entails substantial difficulties - if it is indeed 
practicable at all. It may be impracticable, for one thing, simply because 
the parents who are willing to accept random drug testing for athletes are 
not willing to accept accusatory drug testing for all students, which trans-
forms the process into a badge of shame. Respondents' proposal brings 
the risk that teachers will impose testing arbitrarily upon troublesome but 
not drug-likely students. It generates the expense of defending lawsuits 
that charge such arbitrary imposition, or that simply demand greater pro-
cess before accusatory drug testing is imposed. And not least of all, it 
adds to the ever-expanding diversionary duties of schoolteachers the new 
function of spotting and bringing to account drug abuse, a task for which 
they are ill prepared, and which is not readily compatible with their vo-
cation. In many respects, we think, testing based on "suspicion" of drug 
use would not be better, but worse.122 
The most objectionable aspect of this passage is the violence that it 
does to established Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Acton majority 
treats random testing and testing upon reasonable suspicion as being es-
sentially the same, perhaps slightly different in degree, but not different 
in kind. 123 But in point of fact, the two are quite different in kind, which 
is why the Supreme Court and the lower courts theretofore had required 
at least individualized suspicion to justify a search, except in exceed-
ingly rare instances in which circumstances much more compelling than 
those in the instant case were present. 
If one begins with what might be called mainstream criminal law 
enforcement - that is, where there is no room for the "special needs" 
analysis often used in assaying inspections and regulatory searches - it 
is clear that blanket and random searches for evidence of crime are un-
Also, the dissenters cogently note that student Acton, who refused to consent to such 
testing and then challenged the procedures in court, was at that time in grade school, 
and that if there existed a drug problem at that level "one would not know it from this 
record." 115 S. Ct. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
122. 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (citations omitted). 
123. As the Acton dissenters said of the majority opinion: "Far from acknowledg-
ing anything special about individualized suspicion, the Court treats a suspicion-based 
regime as if it were just any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternative - that is, an al-
ternative that officials may bypass if the lesser intrusion, in their reasonable estimation, 
is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to practicability." 115 S. Ct. at 2402 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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questionably impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. And thus in 
Carroll v. United States, 124 holding the warrantless search of a vehicle 
unreasonable because of the absence of probable cause, the Court de-
clared: "It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent 
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding li-
quor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the in-
convenience and indignity of such a search." 125 As the Acton dissenters 
elaborated, this Carroll view is "well-grounded in history" and is alive 
and well today, so that "it remains the law that the police cannot, say, 
subject to drug testing every person entering or leaving a certain drug-
ridden neighborhood in order to find evidence of crime."126 
Admittedly, the Carroll doctrine standing alone does not settle the 
tough question in Acton, for the drug testing at issue there was hardly 
an instance of mainstream criminal law enforcement. Rather, it was 
Fourth Amendment activity of a different kind, just as with the various 
other special situations often characterized as inspections or regulatory 
searches. What all of these situations have in common is that the Su-
preme Court and lower courts have engaged in a process of "balancing 
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails" 127 and, 
when "special needs" 128 so tipped the scales, have permitted some sort 
of departure from the traditional probable cause requirement. Those de-
partures have been of two different kinds - (1) requiring only lesser 
individualized suspicion or (2) requiring no individualized suspicion but 
124. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
125. 267 U.S. at 153-54. 
126. Acton, 115 S. Ct at 2398, 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 3 WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 9.5(b), at 551-53 (2d ed. 1987)). Indeed, when it 
comes to searching for evidence in a mainstream criminal law enforcement context, the 
Court has not even been willing to tolerate a lesser departure from the probable cause 
requirement by permitting such a search upon a less substantial degree of individualized 
reasonable suspicion. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (moving stereo 
equipment to see serial numbers on back an illegal search; Court rejects dissent's sug-
gestion "that we uphold the action here on the ground that it was a 'cursory inspection' 
rather than a 'full-blown search,' and could therefore be justified by reasonable suspi-
cion instead of probable cause"). 
Of course, even in mainstream criminal law enforcement there may arise a need to 
conduct a search for some reason other than obtaining evidence, and the nature of that 
reason may be such that it would be nonsensical to require probable cause. Such is the 
case as to inventory of an arrestee's effects. As the Court has stated: "The probable 
cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine 
administrative caretaking functions." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 
(1976). 
127. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
128. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 351 (1985)). 
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only a random or other nonarbitrary selection process - but it is the 
cases in the latter category that deserve attention here. Specifically, it 
must be asked whether Acton is at all like those cases in terms of either 
the intrusion permitted or the justification for the intrusion. 
In some of these cases the nature of the permitted intrusion is dif-
ferent because it is a brief seizure rather than a less-intrusive-than-usual 
search that was allowed. Thus, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 129 
Delaware v .. Prouse, 130 and Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 131 
where the Court manifested its willingness to permit the brief stopping 
of all traffic at vehicular checkpoints in order to check for illegal aliens, 
driver's licenses, and intoxicated drivers, respectively, in each instance 
the Court made it quite clear that it was not authorizing even minor 
searches of the vehicle, driver, or other occupants.132 This suggests a 
greater willingness by the Court to permit minor seizures than so-called 
minor searches, as is also reflected by the dichotomy in mainstream law 
enforcement, where police acting on reasonable suspicion are allowed 
to make minor seizures of persons and things133 but not minor searches 
for evidence.134 Doubtless this reflects a perception by the Court that 
while it is quite easy to see how a minor seizure can be dramatically 
different from a full-blown one - compare a brief checkpoint stop with 
a stationhouse arrest - it is not so apparent that a search can be 
deemed so minimally intrusive that it should be permitted for that rea-
son alone even absent reasonable suspicion. It thus would seem that 
Martinez-Fuerte, Prouse, and Sitz afford little if any support for the re-
sult reached in Acton. The momentary seizures permitted in those cases 
were the smallest of Fourth Amendment intrusions, but in Acton the 
search, though somewhat limited in intrusiveness by the commendable 
procedures followed, was not in the same sense dramatically different in 
kind from, say, a search of the students' pockets. Indeed, as Justice 
Scalia, the author of the Acton majority opinion, put it on another occa-
129. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
130. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
131. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
132. As for the alien checkpoint, the Court earlier had made it clear that a search 
of the vehicle for aliens was not permissible. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 
(1975). As for the driver's license checkpoint discussed in Prouse, the Court there was 
considering only "detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the re-
gistration of the automobile." 440 U.S. at 663. As for the DWI checkpoint, the Court in 
Sitz emphasized it had not authorized "[d]etention of particular motorists for more ex-
tensive field sobriety testing." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451. 
133. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I 
(1968). 
134. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 
(1979). 
August 1996] Fourth Amendment 2577 
sion, state-compelled collection and testing of urine, though not the 
most intrusive of searches, are nonetheless "particularly destructive of 
privacy and offensive to personal dignity." 135 
What then of the pre-Acton cases permitting searches without even 
reasonable suspicion? Admittedly there are various circumstances in 
which the courts have agreed that such searches may be conducted, 
most notably, upon the occasion of a border crossing into the country, 136 
prior to the boarding of a commercial airliner, 137 in the course of carry-
ing out a housing138 or business139 inspection program, in searching pris-
oners following contact visits, 140 and, at least sometimes, as in Skinner 
v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn. 141 and National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 142 as part of a drug-testing program. But all of those 
situations are significantly different from that in Acton, from the stand-
point of one or more of these relevant considerations: (1) the nature of 
the intrusion; (2) the magnitude of "the special need" being addressed; 
and (3) the impossibility of responding to that need via an 
individualized-suspicion test. 
The premises-inspection cases are unique because of the imper-
sonal character of the search involved. This is especially true as to the 
inspection of businesses, when the focus of the search is upon business 
records, safety equipment, or other materials having to do with the busi-
ness itself rather than the persons who might be there in an employer or 
employee capacity. But even as to housing inspections, it may be said, 
as the Court put it in Camara v. Municipal Court, 143 that the inspections 
are not "personal in nature." The concern of the inspector is directed 
toward such facilities as the plumbing, heating, ventilation, gas and 
electrical systems, and toward the accumulation of garbage and deb-
ris, 144 and there is no rummaging through the private papers and effects 
of the householder. By comparison, the type of search at issue in Acton 
is very personal in nature, intruding, as the Court earlier put it in 
135. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) 
(Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
136. See 4 LAFAVE. supra note 60, § 10.5. 
137. See id. § 10.6. 
138. See id. § 10.1. 
139. See id. § 10.2. 
140. See id. § 10.9. 
141. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
142. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
143. 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
144. For a detailed account of the objects of inspection under these programs, see 
David Stahl & James C. Kuhn, Jr., Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. PITr. 
L. REv. 256, 264-75 (1950). 
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Skinner, upon "an excretory function traditionally shielded by great 
privacy." 145 
Second, many of the situations in which searches are permitted 
without individualized suspicion are distinguishable from Acton because 
of the magnitude of the risk involved - as the Acton dissenters put it, 
because those searches were responsive to situations in which "even 
one undetected instance of wrongdoing could have injurious conse-
quences for a great number of people." 146 Such is the case as to build-
ing inspections, where even a single safety code violation can cause 
"fires and epidemics [that] ravage large urban areas"; 147 as to airport 
screening, where even a single hijacked plane can result in the destruc-
tion of "hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of prop-
erty"; 148 and also as to some drug testing, as in Skinner, where a single 
drug-impaired train operator can produce "disastrous consequences" in-
cluding "great human loss," 149 and as in Von Raab, where a customs 
official using drugs can cause the noninterdiction of a "sizable" drug 
shipment and consequently injury to the lives of many, and perhaps a 
breach of "national security." 150 Although a drug-free educational envi-
ronment is a significant government interest, it is quite obviously not of 
the same order as those just mentioned.151 
Third, and perhaps most important of all, the pre-Acton cases al-
lowing a search without individualized suspicion "upheld the suspi-
cionless search only after first recognizing the Fourth Amendment's 
long-standing preference for a suspicion-based search regime, and then 
pointing to sound reasons why such a regime would likely be ineffec-
tual under the unusual circumstances presented." 152 In Camara, for ex-
ample, the Court emphasized that an individualized suspicion standard 
was impracticable for safety inspections because evidence of code vio-
lations ordinarily was not observable from outside the premises. Simi-
145. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626. 
146. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2402 (1995) (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting). 
147. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535. 
148. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Bell, 404 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(Friendly, CJ., concurring)). 
149. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. 
150. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670, 674 
(1979). 
151. This is why the court of appeals, Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 
1514, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), held that the students' privacy expectations were not out-
weighed by "extreme dangers and hazards" of the type recognized in other contexts as 
authorizing random testing. 
152. Acton, I 15 S. Ct. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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larly, suspicionless searches of prisoners after contact visits are permis-
sible precisely because the extent of scrutiny necessary to obtain 
individualized suspicion would cause "obvious disruption of the confi-
dentiality and intimacy that these visits are intended to afford." 153 Simi-
lar analysis is to be found in the Court's prior drug-testing cases; in 
Skinner, requiring individualized suspicion for testing train operators af-
ter an accident was deemed not feasible because "the scene of a serious 
rail accident is chaotic," 154 while in Von Raab the point was that a sus-
picion requirement for the testing of customs officials was impractical 
because it was "not feasible to subject [such] employees and their work 
product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more 
traditional office environments."155 The border search and airport search 
cases are obviously distinguishable in like manner, for in each instance 
the authorities find themselves in essentially a now-or-never situation as 
to a large volume of travelers who could not feasibly have been sub-
jected to prior scrutiny. 156 
By contrast, there is no comparable justification for allowing 
school athlete drug tests without individualized suspicion, for, as the 
Acton dissenters ably put it: 
[N]owhere is it less clear that an individualized suspicion requirement 
would be ineffectual than in the school context. In most schools, the en-
tire pool of potential search targets - students - is under constant su-
pervision by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, 
hallways, or locker rooms . 
. . . The great irony of this case is that most (though not all) of the 
evidence the District introduced to justify its suspicionless drug-testing 
program consisted of first- or second-hand stories of particular, identifi-
able students acting in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion 
of in-school drug use - and thus that would have justified a drug-related 
search [on reasonable suspicion] under our T.L.O. decision.157 
In other words, because the reasonable suspicion test is feasible in those 
circumstances, 158 there was no room under existing Fourth Amendment 
153. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 n.40 (1979). 
154. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 631 (1979). 
155. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1979). 
156. By contrast, when authorities have an opportunity for continued surveillance 
away from the border, a Fourth Amendment intrusion without individualized suspicion 
is unreasonable, for "the nature of illegal alien traffic and the characteristics of smug-
gling operations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators." United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975). 
157. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2403 (1995) (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
158. Although some of the Acton majority's comments quoted earlier are to the ef-
fect that the reasonable suspicion approach "may be impracticable," 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 
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doctrine for either the school board or the Court to opt for the blanket-
random search regime. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS OF A DISPIRITED PATRON SAINT 
It is my judgment, then, that both the Evans and Acton cases were 
decided wrongly. The basic error in Evans is that the Court has taken an 
unnecessarily narrow view of the exclusionary rule's deterrence func-
tion and thus has failed to see that in terms of systemic deterrence there 
is goo~ reason to suppress evidence on the facts of that case - the po-
lice would then appreciate that no benefits were to be derived from 
their future failures to ensure that court personnel keep arrest warrant 
records current. As for Acton, the fundamental mistake by the Court 
was in failing to appreciate that a suspicionless standard for conducting 
searches is unnecessary when the significant risks of serious physical 
injury are not present and the opportunities exist for using a reasonable 
suspicion standard to single out those who ought to be tested. As a re-
sult, the Fourth Amendment has suffered two more significant blows. 
Some doubtless would challenge that assessment as nothing more 
than the overblown lament of a rather frustrated patron saint. After all, 
so this argument might proceed, Evans dealt only with an oversight by 
a civilian clerk employed by the judicial branch of the government in 
circumstances in which no plausible claim was or could have been 
made that the police should have engaged in oversight or should have 
suspected that the recordkeeping system was malfunctioning. And 
Acton did nothing more than uphold the actions of one particular school 
board that decided to allow random but suspicionless drug tests of ath-
letes when the board found itself confronted with drug-infested schools 
fueled by the role-model effect of athletes' drug use. Because these two 
cases had to do with such extraordinarily unique situations not likely to 
recur with great frequency, the argument continues, no great harm has 
been done, even assuming Evans and Acton were wrongly decided. At 
worst, they represent two minor dents in the Fourth Amendment's 
armor! 
the case is never really made out. They speculate that parents might not approve "accu-
satory drug testing" and that teachers might "impose testing arbitrarily" because they 
are "ill prepared" to spot symptoms of drug abuse. 115 S. Ct. at 2396. But as the dis-
senters point out, such objections "ignore the fact that such a regime would not exist in 
a vacuum" because schools "already have adversarial, disciplinary schemes that require 
teachers and administrators in many areas besides drug use to investigate student 
wrongdoing," and also the fact that existing Fourth Amendment doctrine would justify 
testing of those students who engaged in the kind of "severe disruption" that has "a 
strong nexus to drug use." 115 S. Ct. at 2402, 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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I wish I could believe that this were the case, but after decades of 
close attention to the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment cases, I can-
not bring myself to that conclusion. Too often, what might seem at 
worst a minor misstep at the time turns out, when viewed from the· 
clearer perspective provided by the passage of time, to have been a step 
over the cliff. Minor constrictions on the Fourth Amendment often take 
on broader dimensions when revisited by the Supreme Court. But it is 
not even necessary for this to happen for the Fourth Amendment to take 
a major hit in the long run. In terms of what the Fourth Amendment ac-
tually means to you and me, we must consider not only the language of 
the Supreme Court's decisions, but also how that language is thereafter 
treated by the lower judiciary and by executive and administrative agen-
cies at the operational levels - in this context, police departments and 
school boards, respectively. As Professor Amsterdam once put it, a pro-
nouncement by the Supreme Court concerning the Fourth Amendment 
"filters down to the level of flesh and blood suspects only through the 
refracting layers of lower courts, trial judges, magistrates and police of-
ficials," and "in few other areas of law are the filters as opaque as in 
the area of suspects' rights." 159 No small part of my concern with Evans 
and Acton has to do with how these cases will be treated in the days 
ahead, either by these lesser actors in the system or by the Supreme 
Court itself, for both of these decisions appear to me to have great po-
tential to overflow their banks. 
As to Evans, for example, it might be asked whether in future 
cases involving negligent recordkeeping by court personnel the defend-
ant could ever prevail on the ground that there was a sufficient police 
perception of a problem with the recordkeeping system that the police 
could no longer reasonably rely upon it. Certainly that possibility can-
not be totally ignored, for the Court in Evans did not hold that the ex-
clusionary rule is inevitably inapplicable in these clerk-error cases. In-
deed, it might even be asserted that a majority of the Court has made it 
rather clear that in an Evans-type case exclusion is called for if the 
defendant makes an additional showing that the police, meaning the po-
lice agency, not the arresting officer, are at fault. This majority is made 
up of the two Evans dissenters plus the three-Justice group represented 
by the O'Connor concurrence, where this important limitation on Evans 
is put forward: 
[T]he Court does not hold that the court employee's mistake in this case 
was necessarily the only error that may have occurred and to which the 
159. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in 
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 785, 792 (1970). 
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exclusionary rule might apply. While the police were innocent of the 
court employee's mistake, they may or may not have acted reasonably in 
their reliance on the recordkeeping system itself. Surely it would not be 
reasonable for the police to rely, say, on a record.keeping system, their 
own or some other agency's, that has no mechanism to ensure its accu-
racy over time and that routinely leads to false arrests, even years after 
the probable cause for any such arrest has ceased to exist (if it ever 
existed).160 
But I am not optimistic. This proposition, at best, is likely to be held 
out as a possible exception to Evans should a defendant ever make the 
requisite showing. But it will be difficult for a defendant ever to make 
out a factual showing as to what the experience has been with a particu-
lar recordkeeping system over time. And if a showing of several prior 
mistakes emerges, I have a feeling it will be found to fall short of the 
seemingly high threshold erected by the O'Connor concurrence - that 
the system "routinely leads to false arrests." 161 
Consider next a case that is factually very similar to Evans except 
that the errant clerk is not an employee of some other agency, such as 
the court, but rather is an employee of the police department itself. Will 
Evans be extended to such a case? I hope the answer is no, if for no 
other reason than to keep a bad decision as narrowly confined as possi-
ble, but I am not optimistic. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, albeit 
speaking in criticism of what the Court has done in Evans, assert that 
"it is artificial to distinguish between court clerk and police clerk 
slips," 162 and those words may be thrown back at them later. Also note-
worthy is the fact that the O'Connor-Souter-Breyer opinion says that 
the true question is whether there was reasonable or unreasonable police 
reliance "on a recordkeeping system, their own or some other 
agency's." 163 This passage strongly indicates that they do not place sig-
nificance upon the identity of the errant clerk's employer. The argument 
on the other side is that when the clerk is also a member of the police 
department, whether a civilian employee or a uniformed officer, it be-
comes harder to deny that the police agency itself is in a position to 
remedy the situation and might well do so if the exclusionary rule is 
there to remove the incentive to do otherwise.164 But here as well I 
160. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1194 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
161. 115 S. Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
162. 115 S. Ct. at 1200 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
163. 115 S. Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
164. Consider in this regard that the state court of appeals in Evans, which took 
essentially the same approach as that later adopted by the United States Supreme Court, 
distinguished State v. Greene, 783 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), where apparently the 
negligent failure to update computer records to delete a quashed arrest warrant was at-
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would not bet the fann that this will be the outcome when this issue is 
considered by either lower courts or the Supreme Court. 
Especially if Evans is extended to negligent recordkeeping by po-
lice clerks, the question then will doubtless arise whether the exclusion-
ary rule also should be withdrawn from other cases in which the arrest-
ing officer reasonably relied on information from other police sources 
that turned out to be false. This situation would include those cases in 
which there is an error in a police record, computerized or otherwise, 
but the mistake is not that of the recordkeepers, but of detectives and 
other police officials who supplied information for the records. Or, it 
might even include those cases in which there is no formal recordkeep-
ing involved but the arresting officer innocently relies upon some other 
police source that falsely asserts that there is a warrant, that grounds to 
arrest otherwise exist, or that certain facts are then known about a cer-
tain crime or suspect. Certainly the answer to this question ought to be 
no. If police officers lacking reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
nonetheless may bring about Terry stops and full-fledged arrests, re-
spectively, merely by getting some other officer to do the dirty work, 
and then may use any incriminating evidence obtained incident to such 
unjustified seizures, the day finally will have arrived when the Fourth 
Amendment is truly nothing more than "a form of words." 165 
But the possibility of Evans being pushed this far cannot be dis-
missed out of hand in light of some of the things said by the majority in 
that decision. For one thing, there is the footnote reference to the Solici-
tor General's amicus argument - not reached by the Court - "that an 
analysis similar to that we apply here to court personnel also would ap-
ply in order to determine whether the evidence should be suppressed if 
tributable to a police department employee. Greene was grounded in the conclusion that 
"the ends of the exclusionary rule would be furthered in an appreciable way by holding 
the evidence inadmissible because such a holding would tend to deter the South Tucson 
Police Department from deliberately or negligently failing to keep its paperwork or 
computer entries up to date." 783 P.2d at 830; see also State v. Stringer, 372 S.E.2d 
426, 428 (Ga. 1988) (holding that an arrest on a recalled warrant is invalid, and fact that 
arresting officer acted in good faith makes no difference when, as here, the department 
"knew or should have known that their information about the bench warrant was incor-
rect''); People v. Joseph, 470 N.E.2d 1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that where 
before arrest warrant had been quashed, arrest was illegal; and that Leon "good faith" 
exception was not applicable here, as the matter within the responsibility and control of 
police authorities who failed to update their records to accurately reflect defendant's 
current status); State v. Trenidad, 595 P.2d 957 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that war-
rant had been quashed but dispatcher erroneously told officer valid warrant still was 
outstanding; and declaring arrest invalid and good faith of arresting officer irrelevant). 
165. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). 
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police personnel were responsible for the error." 166 For another, there is 
the frightening assertion that the Court's earlier decisions do not resolve 
that question. As for United States v. Hensley, 167 upholding a Terry stop 
made in reasonable reliance upon a flyer issued by another department 
that possessed reasonable suspicion, that case was dismissed with the 
observation that because there had been no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion there, it did not resolve "whether the seized evidence should have 
been excluded"168 had reasonable suspicion at the source been lacking. 
As for Whiteley v. Warden, 169 no similar assertion was possible, as the 
evidence had been suppressed because of the Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, i.e., lack of probable cause at the source of a radio bulletin upon 
which the arresting officer reasonably relied. But Whiteley was dis-
missed summarily on the basis that it was grounded in the now-rejected 
approach under which "the Court treated identification of a Fourth 
Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusion-
ary rule to evidence secured incident to that violation." 170 
My fear, however, is that Evans ultimately might work even 
greater mischief than this. If the point of Evans, together with Leon and 
Krull, is that when an arresting or searching officer violates the Fourth 
Amendment and the fault lies with public officials having clerical, judi-
cial, or legislative functions, there is no point to evidence exclusion be-
cause those latter officials need not be or would not be deterred, then it 
certainly may be contended that seizures and searches actually made by 
nonpolice should be treated likewise because once again those persons, 
unlike the police themselves, are not appropriate objects of the exclu-
sionary rule's deterrent function. Recall that this issue has not yet been 
ruled upon by the Supreme Court, which noted in T.L.O. that the appli-
cability of the exclusionary rule in such cases remains an open question. 
As for the kinds of nonpolice mentioned in T.L.O. - building inspec-
tors, OSHA inspectors, firefighters - nothing in Evans, Leon, or Krull 
casts serious doubt upon the applicability of both the Fourth Amend-
ment and its exclusionary rule to their investigative activities. After all, 
they are on a fairly regular basis engaged in the competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime or at least quasi-criminal violations, and thus 
even the somewhat narrower conception of the deterrence function ac-
cepted in the aforementioned three Supreme Court decisions has mean-
ing with respect to the actions of those officials. 
166. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194 n.5. 
167. 469 U.S. 221 (1985). 
168. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192. 
169. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
170. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192. 
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But there may be other, less obvious cases in which Evans will 
push the Supreme Court or lower courts in the wrong direction. Talce, 
for example, the question that the Court in T.L.O. found it unnecessary 
to answer, whether "the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlaw-
ful searches conducted by school authorities," 171 which even in pre"-
Evans days had produced a split of authority.172 I believe that Evans 
makes it much easier for courts to answer that question in the negative, 
though that is not the way this issue ought to be resolved. As noted in 
State v. Baccino, 173 the notion that public employees outside law en-
forcement, like truly private individuals, would not be deterred by an 
exclusionary rule "may be true in the case of isolated private 
searches," 174 but "is inapposite to the situation of a school principal 
who has a duty to investigate unlawful activity." 175 Moreover, as Justice 
Stevens pointed out in T.L.0., in "the case of evidence obtained in 
171. New Jersey v. T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1985). 
172. Compare In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1298 n.17 (Cal. 1985) (holding 
that evidence seized in a school's illegal search is not admissible in juvenile court -
"the exclusionary rule is the only appropriate remedy.") and Ex rel. J.A., 406 N.E.2d 
958, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (declaring that juveniles in delinquency proceedings are 
entitled to "all constitutional protections against unlawful searches and seizures ... and 
... the exclusionary rule is also applicable") and State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 320 
(La. 1975), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Louisiana v. Mora, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), 
modified, 330 So. 2d 900 (La.) (noting that in the presence of an illegal school search 
"the fruits of such a search may not be used by the State prosecutorial agency as the 
basis for criminal proceedings"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976) with D.R.C. v. 
State, 646 P.2d 252, 258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (arguing that a search by school offi-
cials constitutes "state action" subject to constitutional limitations, but that no suppres-
sion was required given "the purpose served by the exclusionary rule," as "enforce-
ment of school regulations ... provide[s] substantial incentives to 'search' that would 
not be lessened by the suppression of evidence at a subsequent delinquency proceed-
ing") and State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 591 (Ga.) (noting that although "public 
school officials are state officers acting under color of law, whose action is therefore 
state action which must comport with the Fourth Amendment," the exclusionary rule i's 
not applicable "to searches by non-law enforcement persons"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1039 (1975). 
173. 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971). 
174. 282 A.2d at 871; see, e.g., People v. Scott, 117 Cal. Rptr. 925 (Ct. App. 
1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule is not applicable where airport manager, while 
looking in car illegally parked by plane for the ignition key or registration certificate, 
found marijuana; and stressing that while one of his duties was to supervise enforce-
ment of safety regulations at the airport, actual enforcement always was left to law of-
ficers, and manager himself did not issue citations or otherwise engage in criminal in-
vestigations, and was not seeking evidence of crime at time he looked into the car); 
Roberts v. State, 443 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that the exclu-
sionary rule was not applicable when a membership clerk in the alumni office of Flor-
ida State University looked in the desk of a fellow employee after receiving several 
complaints from membership applicants). 
175. Baccino, 282 A.2d at 871. 
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school searches, the 'overall educative effect' of the exclusionary rule 
adds important symbolic force to this utilitarian judgment." 176 
In similar fashion, there is reason to believe that the rule of the 
Acton case likewise will become more expansive over time. While drug 
testing of students was rare before Acton because of doubts as to its le-
gality, in and even after Acton doubtless will be avoided by many 
school districts for a variety of reasons, 178 I expect that several school 
boards will be prompted into action because of community pressures to 
do so.179 A careful reading of Acton would produce the conclusion that 
the Supreme Court did no more than say that the constitutional issue is 
whether the testing program "is one that a reasonable guardian and tu-
tor might undertake," 180 and that an affirmative answer was proper in 
that case because of the record regarding the awesome dimensions of 
the drug problem in the Vernonia School District. But I will bet my 
shirt such nuances will be lost on some school boards and, indeed, 
some lower courts, who will interpret Acton just as it was often con-
strued by the press - as endorsing the broad proposition that "drug 
tests don't infringe on students' privacy because student athletes have a 
176. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976)). He 
continued: 
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful 
exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry. If the Na-
tion's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive 
of personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have been dealt with un-
fairly. The application of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings arising 
from illegal school searches makes an important statement to young people that 
"our society attaches serious consequences to a violation of constitutional 
rights," and that this is a principle of "liberty and justice for all." 
469 U.S. at 373-74 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 492; 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1982)). 
177. "Such programs have been quite rare, a lawyer for the National School 
Boards Association said today, because school board lawyers have regarded them as 
constitutionally dubious and an invitation to lawsuits." Linda Greenhouse, High Court 
Upholds Drug Tests for Some Public School Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at Al 
(citing Gwendolyn H. Gregory). 
178. "But most school officials said they hoped to avoid such programs, because 
they would rather spend money on education than urine tests, because they did not want 
to have to assign a staff member to watch athletes urinate and collect the sample or be-
cause they found the whole idea of testing offensively invasive." Tamar Lewin, Despite 
Ruling, Wide Drug Testing of Students Is Not Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995, at 
B7. 
179. "Several school principals and superintendents said they expected some pres-
sure to do drug testing from parents reluctant to confront their own children about drug 
use." Id. 
180. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995). 
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reduced expectation of privacy." 181 School drug-testing programs thus 
will sometimes be adopted and upheld without a careful assessment of 
the needs at a particular educational institution. 
Another question about Acton that is bound to arise is whether it 
properly may be relied upon to justify blanket-random testing of the 
student body at large. Significantly, Justice Ginsburg penned a brief 
concurring opinion in Acton stating her understanding of the majority 
opinion "as reserving the question whether the District, on no more 
than the showing made here, constitutionally could impose routine drug 
testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports, 
but on all students required to attend school." 182 She immediately fol-
lowed that observation with a reference to an airport search case em-
phasizing that such suspicionless scrutiny is avoidable "by choosing not 
to travel by air." 183 It is significant that this theme runs through most of 
the nonsuspicion search cases: the airline traveler, the border crosser, 
the businessman who elects to undertake a closely regulated business, 
the employee who elects to take a job necessitating his close scrutiny, 
all in a sense can be said to have opted for this highly unusual suspi-
cionless search regime.184 It is also significant that this very point was 
given considerable emphasis by the Acton majority. They stressed that 
student athletes have "even less" privacy than students generally be-
cause in choosing to participate in athletics "they voluntarily subject 
themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on 
students generally." 185 Extending Acton to blanket-random testing of all 
students, then, would be quite a leap, for students generally cannot be· 
said to have elected "voluntarily" to participate in an activity that sub-
jects them to the watered-down Fourth Amendment protections of 
T.L.O. and Acton. It is parental pressure and the mandatory attendance 
laws that ensure that they will be subjected, in the language of Acton, to 
"a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over 
181. The case was characterized thus in an editorial in News-Gazette, (Champaign, 
Ill.), calling upon school boards to opt for such testing. See NEWS-GAZEITE (Cham-
paign, Ill.), June 30, 1995, at A4. 
182. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
183. 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
184. The notion is not that by electing to engage in that activity the person has im-
pliedly consented to the search, but only that this opportunity to avoid such intense 
scrutiny is of some relevance in making a judgment about the reasonableness of a suspi-
cionless search scheme. 
185. 115 S. Ct. at 2393. 
2588 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2553 
free adults." 186 But this leap187 may well be taken, for doubtless there 
will be considerable pressure to mandate and uphold the application of 
blanket-random search procedures to all students when singling out ath-
letes seems irrational, as whenever, like Acton, drugs have produced a 
discipline problem of "epidemic proportions,"188 but, unlike Acton, the 
problem dcies not include "particularly those involved in interscholastic 
athletics." 189 
However, even that is not a complete measure of the harm likely to 
occur as a result of the Acton decision. As noted in the earlier critique 
of that decision, the Supreme Court went beyond the boundaries of its 
earlier rulings regarding suspicionless searches in a very significant 
way. Acton is the first case in which the Court has upheld a search of a 
quite personal nature absent individualized suspicion when the authori-
ties were not confronted with either a now-or-never situation (e.g., as 
with airport boarding searches) or risks (e.g., aircraft hijacking) far ex-
ceeding the absence of a drug-free educational environment. I find it 
difficult to believe that the Supreme Court will take one step but only 
one step beyond the pre-Acton boundary. Thus another likely legacy of 
that case is that still other suspicionless search programs will be upheld 
without a convincing showing that whatever problems are addressed 
could not be treated adequately within the framework of a reasonable 
suspicion requirement. 
Some may find these prognostications unduly pessimistic. Some 
may believe I am merely playing the devil's advocate, an unseemly pos-
ture for a saint, patron or otherwise. To the latter, I could respond with 
the Shakespearean retort that I even "seem a saint, when most I play 
the devil." 190 Or, I could acknowledge frankly that perhaps it is time for 
me to get out of the patron saint business. I could declare, Mark 1\vain 
style, that the reports of my sanctification have been greatly exagger-
ated, or I simply could adopt the title of patron saint emeritus. But then 
who would be the patron saint of the Fourth Amendment? Well, one 
186. 115 S. Ct. at 2392. 
187. Or, perhaps, a half leap. Some have speculated that testing "everyone who 
participates in extracurricular activities" could be done under Acton. Lewin, supra note 
178, at B7. But this is hardly beyond dispute, for the Court in Acton also stressed the 
Joss of privacy that attends participation in sports, which is not a factor as to, say, par-
ticipation in the school band. 
188. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ac-
ton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)). 
189. 115 S. Ct. at 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Acton, 796 F. 
Supp. at 1357). 
190. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD ill act l, SC. 3, line 338 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1954). 
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might think that this is an assignment that quite naturally belongs to the 
Supreme Court. If the Court were to take on this task, certainly there 
could be no better - nor more overdue - first step than to embrace 
wholeheartedly these words from Boyd v. United States: 
[l]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing ... by 
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. 
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional pro-
visions for the security of person and property should be liberally con-
strued. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their effi-
cacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted 
more in sound that in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful 
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon.191 
History has proven the wisdom of this teaching. Had it been followed 
in the recent past, I am confident that neither Evans nor Acton would 
have been decided as it was. 
191. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
